After a disappointing draw with Italy the world champions are locked in debate over whether to stick with for six midfielders or go back to a straight No9
When Vicente del Bosque sent on Jesús Navas and then Fernando Torres last night, some read it as an admission that his original plan was not working. It was time for something completely different. It was time for width and it was time for a striker. An actual striker. The threat posed by Torres reinforced that sensation even if his finishing did not. Spain's first big debate of the tournament arrived with the very first game. Newspapers were this morning asking: should Spain play with a No9? Both José Mourinho and Luis Aragonés thought so.
Del Bosque though insisted that the plan had not worked badly. He also hinted that he sees the Chelsea striker mainly as a man to make an impact from the bench when legs are tired and spaces wide. As for Torres himself, he noted: "If Cesc [Fábregas] keeps scoring, he should keep playing." That is a rather important detail that seems to have gone almost overlooked: it was Del Bosque's starting "striker" who got the goal. Spain might have looked more dangerous after the substitutions but the equaliser had come before them. Despite Antonio Di Natale's opener, Fábregas's goal had also come after a flurry of Spain chances at the start of the second half.
On the eve of the game, Del Bosque had smiled and said that he was sure what his starting lineup would be. What he was not going to do was reveal it. Ten names were certain, one was not. Three times in the pre-match press conference he was asked questions that, while posed differently, asked essentially the same thing: Torres or Alvaro Negredo? In the end, the answer was: neither. Del Bosque chose Fábregas instead. "Even I didn't expect that," Fábregas admitted.
There was no striker but there were six midfielders on for Spain. Andrés Iniesta, David Silva and Fábregas made up a forward line that denied Italy a reference point. Spain had already successfully employed Silva as a false No9 against Scotland, while Barcelona had won the World Club Championships with a formation that the beaten coach in the final, Muricy Ramalho, described as a 3-7-0. Here, it was Fábregas who played more centrally as the false striker, as he has done with Barcelona, while Silva drifted right – a formula designed to get as many of Spain's best players on the pitch as possible.
"Fábregas is a very special midfielder," Del Bosque explained. "He's not really a centre forward and has great llegada." Llegada is that ability to not be in the penalty area but to arrive there at just the right moment, breaking in from what the Spanish always refer to as the second line of the attack. Del Bosque continued: "That [formation] gives no reference points to the opposition. We wanted to have security on the ball and maintain possession against a very strong team that we knew would pressure us."
"Given that Italy were going to play with three at the back, it was a logical approach," Torres said. "I was a bit worried when I saw Spain were playing without a real striker," said Italy's new centre-back Daniele De Rossi. "I thought it would have been more difficult for me without a reference.
To start with, Spain did not circulate the ball with their normal fluency – there would later be complaints about the slow pitch – and Fábregas had few clear opportunities. Their best work came through Iniesta, fleet of foot as always, but the cutting edge appeared lacking. When Navas came on to give width and, later, Torres joined to provide the ability to run beyond the Italian defence, the sensation shifted. The feeling was inescapable: Spain were more threatening. The causes of that may not be quite so clear cut, though. "In the second half I thought the balance was tipped a bit more in our favour, especially in the final minutes," Del Bosque said.
His predecessor, Aragonés, commented: "I would have played with a striker on the pitch, with Navas wide on the right and Alba on the other wing. Their defenders were not as comfortable when Torres and Navas came on as they had been in the first half when they had no reference point and they were able to bring the ball out quite easily. The second half was much better and Spain could have won easily on the number of chances they made."
Mourinho's analysis was more pointed. "It's not good for there to be so much touch between Xavi [Hernández] , Iniesta and Cesc without creating danger in Buffon's area," he said. "Without a striker they were sterile."
Two questions are raised: were they really sterile before? And: would the changes have had such a great impact earlier on or were they in fact a product of the phase the game had entered into? An additional question runs: did the game enter into that phase – one of tiredness and spaces, one that was ripe for Torres - because of how Spain had approached it until then? Italy's players covered more ground that Spain's; Spain's style tends to force that upon the opposition. In the end Spain racked up 66% possession, the most in the tournament so far – even though Italy had competed for the ball far more than many anticipated. Spain's 19 shots were the second most so far by any team.
"Torres came on at the ideal moment," Del Bosque said. "The game was more open and he had the chance of counterattacks. Games start balanced and then bit by bit they open up and in that situation Torres was ideal for us to try to take advantage of that."
Ultimately, he did not take advantage of course. Spain's false No9 scored; Spain's No9 did not. Spain had actually got the equaliser before the changes were made. Nor was it an isolated moment: there had been chances before it and it was Iniesta who was named the official man of the match. When the goal came it was a perfect reflection of what the coach had sought: Xavi, Iniesta, Silva, Fábregas. Silva's wonderful pass, Fábregas's llegada and finish.
"Cesc," said Xabi Alonso, "scored with a great No9's run." Read More
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